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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STA1E OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif {-Respondent, 
-vs-
GEORGE RAY NEELEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12423 
STATEMENT OF 'l'HE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of George 
Ray Nt>eley for the crime of receiving stolen property in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-38-12 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
George Ray Neeley was convicted of the crime of 
rf'eeiving stolen property in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
• IG-3S-12 (195:3) on December 17, 1970, following a jury 
trial. Th<' HonorahlP .Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, Third 
Judicial Di strict court, presided. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that this Court should af-
firm the District Court's verdict. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the statement of fac~ 
set out by appellant, subject to the following additions: 
1. Both Helen Warnick and Guy Warnick made , 
positive identifications of the coins in Exhibits 3.11 
(Tr. 8-32). 
2. Dennis Madrid had personally told Neeley that 1 
the coins had been stolen but lied to him as to the local-
ity in which the theft of the coins took place - probably 
to mislead Neeley as to the danger of trying to fence the 
coins in Salt Lake City (Tr. pp. 29 and 32). Neverthe-
less, it appears from the testimony of Madrid that 
Neeley was fully aware of the fact that the coins had 
been stolen when he purchased them from Madrid and · 
his accomplice. 
3. Although Charles Pearson, a local coin dealer, , 
claimed he had inspected the coins before he sold them , 
to Neeley, he could not single out one coin, with certain~, 
as a coin he sold to Neeley. However, the State's wit· 
nesses positively identified certain distinguishing marki ' 
that only they would recognize, since they initially pur· 1 
chased the coins, knowing full well the structural flaw5 
· · They ad· inherent upon the faces of the various corns. 
mitted at trial having purchased certain coins becans.eof 
. f f the vartolli unusual or strange markings on the aces o 
coins. (T. pp.13-25). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND REVIEWED 
BY THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE JUDGMENT OF GUILTY RENDERED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
Due to the precarious nature of the crime of re-
ceiYing stolen property, many times the testimony pre-
sented in order to obtain a conviction must be obtained 
from the actual participants in the particular burglary or 
lmwny, due to the lack of external eyewitness testimony. 
In the present case, ample evidence was introduced at 
trial which was taken and received by the jury as proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Neeley committed the 
crime alleged. 
In this case, as in most, the testimony, both pro and 
con, at points, was not as clear as we would expect in an 
open and shut case. However, it was the responsibility 
of the jury to sift through this evidence by weighing the 
credibility of the various witnesses' testimony in a search 
for the truth: 
"The question of the credibility of the witness 
is for the jury and, if there is competent evidence 
upon which reasonable and unpredjudicial minds 
might draw different conclusions, the jury's find-
ings will not be disturbed." State v. Roberts, 91 
Utah 117, 63 P.2d584 (1937). 
Counsel for appellant attacks the credibility of 
Madrid, labeling him an accomplice to the crime for 
which Neeley was charged. Yet the Supreme Court of 
6 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED THE JN. 
FORMATION TO BE AMENDED TO "ON OR 
ABOUT THE 9TH DAY OF JULY," RATHER THAN 
THE 13TH. COUNSELS' ATTEMPT TO SHOW A 
NEED FOR CONFORMING THE EVIDENCE TO 
THE INFORMATION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL 
ENOUGH TO GRANT A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
• 
It has been held where a defendant is not misled or 
prejudiced in making his defense by the allegation cou 
cerning the date of the crime charged, that the date is ' 
unimportant, and a conviction may properly follow upon 
sufficient proof of the commission of the offense at an: 
time within the provisions of the statute of limitations. 
State v. Bayes, 47 U. 474, 478, 155 P. 355 (1916): 
"Where time is not of the essence of the criln1, 
exact time is immaterial, and if evidence other. 
wise supports charge relied upon by prosecution, 
conviction may not be set aside because crilne 
was committed after date charged in information 
or indictment, so long as it was committed prior . 
to bringing of prosecution." State v. Distefa1v1• 
70U. 586, 262 P.113 (1927). 
This Distefano holding is based upon Utah Code • 
Ann.~ 77-21-12 (1953) which states: 
"An information or indictment need contain · 
no allegation of the time of the commission of ilie 1 . . ssarv to offense unless such allegation is nece ·1 
charge the offense under Section 77-21-8." (Em· 
phasis added.) . 
Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Ann. ; 
77-21-43 (1953) affirm the broad leeway granted proit· 
cu tors in amending criminal pleadings: 
7 
" ( 2) No variance between those allegations 
ol' an information, indictment or bill of parti-
culars, which state the particulars of the offense, 
wltl'lher amended or not, and the evidence offered 
in support thereof shall be grounds for the acquit-
tal of defondant. The court may at any time cause 
the information, indictment or bill of particulars 
to be amended in respect to any such variance to 
conform to the evidence. (Emphasis added.) 
" ( 3) If the court is of the opinion that the 
defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon 
the merits by any such defect, imperfection or 
omission by any such variance the court may be-
cause of such variance ... unless the defendant 
objects, postpone the trial, to be had before same 
or another jury, on such tenns as the court con-
siders proper. In determining whether the de-
fendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon 
the merits, the court shall consider all the circum-
stances of the case and the entire course of the 
prosecution." 
• • • 
"In cases of this nature the crucial point is 
whether the defendant was in any way prejudiced 
because of the discrepancy in dates or the man-
ner in which the appellant was charged in the in-
formation." Jones Id. at 290. (State v. Robinson, 
190 Kan. 771, 370 P.2dw 37 (1963) ). 
One of the issues raised with the case at bar was pre-
cisely what date the crime of burglary and receiving the 
stolen goods occurred. Filling out the exact date was 
practically impossible when we consider the fact that the 
Warnicks were out of town for over a week during which 
time the burglary occurred. Therefore, Neeley could 
have recei\'ed the goods anywhere from the 1tl . 
' • '1: 1 ol Juh ' 
to the 10th. 'Ihe precise date would also be l d · · . c ou ea 111 
the fact that the tnal took place almost six 1110 ti, f · . , 11 1~ a te1 t~1e crnne had occurred; but with the positive identifita. 
hon of certain coins by the Warnicks the 'i'111e f ' ' " act1;r 
would not be a substantial element of the crime. In 
United States v. Covington, 411 F.2d 108G (-Hh Cir. C.A. 
1969), the Court said at page 1087: 
"In testing the sufficiency of an indictment. 1 
the alleged date of the offense is not ordinarih 
considered a material allegation." 4 Barron, Fed. 
eral Practice and Procedure, §1913 (Rules Erl. 1 
1951). 
And further a page 1088 : 
'Except when time is of the essence of the 
offense, the prosecution is not confined in its e\'i. 
dence to the precise date laid in the indictment, 
but may prove that the offense was committed 
1 
on some other day prior to the commencement or 
the prosecution and within the period of limita- : 
tions, and such proof does not constitute a mater-
ial variance." Id. at 1088. 42 C.J.S., Indictment! 
1
1 
and Informations,§ 257 (1944). 
I 
The Court stated that time is essential. 
" ... as where it constitutes an element of '.he I 
crime, or where accused having been trie.d lo'. 1 
another and similar offense within the penod Ol r 
limitations, proof of th~ exac~ date is necessarr0~ 1 show that he is not bemg tned for the same · 
f ense · or where two offenses have been com· 
' ' h . dgmen' mitted to enable accused to plead t e JU 
0 
1 
in the present prosecution in the event of a secont 
· ssan 11 prosecution; or where the date 1s nece · 
d 
9 
Pnable the court to impose the proper sentence 
... " 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information, ~ 
257, at 1279 (1944). 
1'irne may also be sub:::;tantial in preparing an alibi 
wlti:'re defense counsel i:::; '':::;urprised" by the changing of 
t!H'. time in the information. Like the Covington case, 
however, the courts must look at the circumstances in-
volved behind the change, as well as the time in which 
tlw information was filed and the time of trial. 
N<~eley had better than four months to prepare any 
possible alibis concerning the charges. The coins were 
seized on the J 0th day of July, and the information was 
prrpared to read the 13th of July. Therefore, Neeley 
knowing that certain coins had been stolen sometime 
prior to the 10th could have retained counsel, found out 
about the elates in question, and established his alibi, 
even th011gh the information said the 13th. 
The Utah statutes afford great latitude and discre-
tion to the trial judge in amending the pleadings of 
either party: 
"An information may be amended, without 
leave of court, in any matter of form or sub-
stance at any time before the defendant pleads 
thereto. It may also be amended in any matter 
of form or substance, by leave of court, at any 
time after the defendant has pleaded to the 
merits, or during the trial. In case an amendment 
is allowed after a plea or during trial, the court 
shall give the defendant such reasonable time as 
may be necessary to meet the new matter set up 
in the amendment. No amendment shall cause any 
10 
delay of trial, except for good cause mad to • 
pear t? the satisfaction of the court, an; unl:;1; 
the defendant shall cause any reason h h ·· 
l th . e niay aw w 1y e tnal shall not forthwith proceed t b p~esented to ~he trial co-i:rt, he shall not be ~r·rt 
m1ttedd to rey1ew the ruling of the court on th, 
amen ment in the Supreme Coitrt." Utah c d 
Ann.§ 77-17-3 (1953). 0 e 
Appellant failed to carry the burden of showing that 
the trial court, in granting the state's amendment as tii 1 
the date of the alleged commission of the crime, was in 1 
a:ny way prejudicial. Neeley had better than six rnonth1 
to prepare his case. At trial the court granted a smn 
day continuance in lieu of the amendment made to the in-
formation. Any prejudicial consequences could haw 
been corrected at that time. 
POINT III 
NEELEY'S THIRD ARGUMENT IS TOTALLY 
WITHOUT MERIT WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
OF SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS ORDERED 
INTO THE TRIAL RECORD WHICH SHOW THAT 
NOTICE AND REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL 
WERE AFFORDED APPELLANT WHEN THE 
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCT'ION WAS GIVEN. 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED. 
Upon motion by the State and the order of th~ 1 
Court allowing supplemental affidavits to be made part 1 
of the trial record Neeley's third argument raisedinhi; 
brief is rendered 'moot. The State agrees in part mili · 
Neeley's contention that Rule 47(n) of the UtahRulesof 
Civil Procedure requires a mandatory attendance or 
11 
noticn to ddendant and/or defense counsel when addi-
tional jnry instructions are given. It is for this very 
reason that N eeley's third argument is rendered moot. 
Affidavits were submitted by the Honorable Judge 
Joseph Jeppson, Richard S. Shepherd, the Deputy 
Distriet Attorney, and Walter R. Ellett, counsel repre-
senting defendant, George Ray Neeley. Both Shepherd 
and Ellett submitted affidavits to the fact that: 
"After the case had been submitted to the 
jury, there was a request for an additional in-
struction. The matter was discussed among Rich-
ard S. Shepherd, Walter R. Ellett and Judge 
Jeppson and after the discussion, an additional 
instruction was drafted and submitted to the 
jury." 
Paragrph 4 of the Honorable Judge J eppson's affi-
davit states: 
"That in the presence of Richard S. Shepherd, 
Deputy District Attorney, and Walter R. Ellett, 
counsel for defendant above named, I prepared an 
additional instruction which is set forth at page 
146 of the record on appeal." 
Both notice and attendance by Mr. Ellett at the 
District.Judge's request were granted during the drafting 
and submission of the written additional instruction. 
Originally Judge Jeppson had prepared a differently 
worded instruction to be submitted to the jury for delib-
eration. However, a the insistence of defense counsel, 
the instruction was changed so as to read identically to 
that found in the record at page 146. 
q 
12 
Although receipt of the "crolu certificat ,, . . 
to e \Va~ in. 
eluded in the information charging· defendant _. , no <11. 
dence of its being received by Neeley was presented at , 
trial. Naturally the jury would be somewhat confused bv 
its inclusion within the record, as well as the questio~ 
of its being included in the assessment of value for 
determination of the extent and degree of the crime. If 
anything can be said with certainty about the supple- ' 
mental instruction it certainly would include the fact that 
the instruction seemed more to protect Neeley's right~ 
than to prejudice them in any way. By requiring !lie 
jury to look to the other property received in detennina-
tion of value, instead of the gold certificate, the $50.00 
limit for a felony charge may very well have not been 
met, thus limiting N eeley's criminal liability to a possible 
misdemeanor. 
As stated in the case of Blevins v. Commonwealth, 
209 Va. 622, 166 S.E.2d 325,, 330 ( 1969), the Court held: 
"Not only has the trial court got the right but 
it has a duty to amend instructions which appear 
to be erroneous or misleading, after summat10n 
by counsel and after the jury has retired to con· 
sider a verdict. In the case at bar the m~re fae~ 
that the instruction was amended at such time~ 
not constitute grounds for mistrial and awarding 
of new trial." 
It is obvious from a reading of the jury instructiW 
as a whole that the issues of fact and law stated and 
h fficient tD raised by the trial judge were more t an su ·ed 
· ht f the aceu~ · fairly represent and safeguard the ng so 
< 
... 
13 
Thi~ judge, i11 the pres1mce of the district attorney and 
rouu~d for def em;e, rendered the clarifying instructions 
to limit the possibility that the jury might construe evi-
dencP, not actually received at trial, against the defend-
ant. Any errors raised by Neeley as to the additional 
instruction seemed beneficially to limit his criminal lia-
bility: 
"After hearing on appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. If error has been committed, it shall not 
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The 
comt must be satisfied that it has that effect be-
fore it is warranted in reversing judgment." Utah 
Code Ann.~ 77-42-1 (1953). 
Supporting the presumption of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-42-1 ( 1953) as related to jury instructions is the case 
of State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957) 
which states : 
"An instruction sufficiently covering the sub-
ject of defendants' failure to testify although not 
a model instruction on that subject was not 
prejudicial when considered with other instruc-
tions." See also State v. Peterson, 121 U. 229, 24 
P.2d 504 (1953) . 
14 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons enumerated herein, respondent sub. 
mits that under the facts of the case no injustice wa.1 
committed against Neeley either by admission of testi-
mony, amending of the information or the supplemental 
jury instruction regarding the gold certificate. Certainly 
N eeley's brief fails to raise incidents of reversible error 
which denied him due process of law as portrayed by the 
record. Therefore, respondent· respectfully submits that 
the jury verdict and conviction in the court of the Honor. 
able Judge of the Third District should thereby be af. 
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VE·RNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
